The paper studies the consequences of the Null Player Out (NPO) property for single-valued solutions on the class of cooperative games in characteristic function form. We allow f o r v ariable player populations (supports or carriers). A solution satis es the NPO property, if elimination of a null player does not a ect the payo s of the other players. Our main emphasis lies on individual values. For linear values satisfying the null player property a n d a w eak symmetry property, necessary and su cient conditions for the NPO property are derived.
Introduction
Here we deal with the standard notion of a cooperative g a m e i n c haracteristic function form, but consider variable player sets (carriers or supports). The characteristic function value represents the maximum aggregate utility the members of each possible coalition of players can achieve through cooperation among themselves. Thus any conceivable negative or positive e xternalities coalition members might impose on each other, have been netted out already. Moreover, a characteristic function conventionally describes a game with side-payments and perfectly transferable utility. That means that utility can freely and without loss be transferred across coalition members. These are strong and, at times, implausible assumptions. But when they are satis ed, one can proceed with thorough analysis. Then \null players", that is individuals whose net contribution to any coalition is zero, can be de ned in a precise way. A ttributes like \ d u m m y" or \null" suggest irrelevance. In a speci c sense, the net e ect of social interaction with players of that kind is zero, indeed. For that reason, dummies are often treated as redundant i n a solution or index: a dummy ends up simply with the utility she can achieve by herself. More speci cally, t h e \ n ull player axiom" or \null player property" allocates zero utility t o n ull players in a utility allocation or assigns zero power to null players in a power index. A priori the null player axiom treats null players di erently from other players. But combined with other axioms, this property often implies that each p l a yer receives or is judged according to some weighted average of his net contributions.
While the null player property means that a null player neither gains nor bene ts in excess of his (zero) net contribution, the power distribution or utilitity allocation within the rest of society can still be a ected by the prese n c e o f a n ull player. This has been illustrated in Haller (1994) with respect to collusive agreements. Removing a null player may a ect the power indices of other players. To see why this is so, consider a game, a coalition of players in the game, a select player of the game not belonging to the coalition, and a probabilistic value for the select player in this game. The select player makes a certain contribution to the given coalition. Next consider the game that is obtained by adding a null player to the original player set and consider a probabilistic value for the select player in the enlarged game. Now the select player makes the previous contribution twice: to the previously given coalition and to the previous coalition joined by t h e n o vice null player. As a rule then, the individual value calculated for the select player is sensitive t o t h e introduction of the null player, unless the probabilities in the enlarged game and the probabilities in the original game are related in the very speci c way of equation (3) below.
Since in general, the presence of a null player can have e ects on other players, it makes sense to investigate the impact of the \null player out" property, abbreviated NPO in the sequel, which requires that a null player does not in uence a power distribution or utility allocation within the rest of society. The focus of this paper lies on the implications of the NPO property for linear values. A companion paper, Derks and Haller (1998) is entirely devoted to the study of weighted nucleoli with the null player property a n d NPO.
Under the label \reduction axiom", the NPO-property p l a ys a crucial rôle in the comparison of two t ypes of collusion in Haller (1994) . Tijs and Driessen (1986) derive a \Dummy P l a yers Out" property for the -value. Also, for linear values, the NPO-property is an implication of population monotonicity. F urthermore, a \carrier-free" or \support-free" de nition of games and va l u e s a s i n D u b e y , Neyman, and Weber (1981) presumes the NPO property.
First and foremost, our curiosity about the NPO-property has been inspired by comparisons of two t ypes of collusion between two p l a yers: fusion or amalgamation a la Lehrer (1988) and a proxy or representation agreement a la Haller (1994) . In a proxy agreement, both players continue to exist physically one of them becomes a null player, whereas the proxy player gets the power to act and sign on behalf of both of them. Amalgamation means that the number of players is reduced the two colluding players are replaced by a single player who acts and signs on behalf of both of them. Technically, t h e case of amalgamation di ers from the proxy case in that in the former type of collusion the designated null player is removed. Haller (1994) demonstrates that this seemingly minor di erence can be crucial. More precisely, h e c o nsiders (in the standard sense) symmetric probabilistic group values and the e ect of collusion on the sum of the va l u e s o f t h e t wo colluding players. He nds that the di erence between proxy agreement and amalgamation does not matter if, and only if, a reduction axiom equivalent to the NPO-property is satis ed.
The outline of the paper is now a s f o l l o ws. Section 2 reviews the underlying concepts. Especially, w e will elaborate on the notions of individual versus group values. For a more comprehensive i n troduction we refer to Weber (1988) . Section 3 is devoted to the NPO property of individual values. Our central result is a characterization of the NPO property f o r v alues that are linear and satisfy the null player and a weak symmetry property. S u c h a value has the NPO property if, and only if, it can be reconstructed from the weight(s) the player attaches to make i t o n h i s o wn, without seeking cooperation. Section 4 extends our ndings to group values. In some respects, these results resemble those of Dubey, Neyman, and Weber (1981) who provide a representation of a \semivalue" by means of the moments of a probability distribution on the unit interval. We relate and compare the two approaches. Finally, section 5 o ers some conclusions.
Preliminaries
In the rst place, we consider nite non-empty s e t s o f p l a yers and the space of cooperative games in characteristic function form for each set of players. A value or, more precisely, a n individual value is a real valued function on the game space. Frequently, a v alue expresses the worth of a game to one of the players involved. In speci c contexts, a value may b e i n terpreted di erently. I t m a y measure the value added by the player or constitute an index of the power of the player. The main focus of our formal investigation is on such individual values. This has been done to some extent i n W eber (1988) whose fundamental research provides an important stepping stone for our own inquiry.
A group value is de ned as a collection of values, one value for each p l a yer involved. A group value corresponds to the standard notion of a single-valued solution concept. In contrast with the usual approach w e do not necessarily assume any a priori interconnection among the individual values such a s symmetry and e ciency.
We consider a non-empty u n i v ersal player set N with generic elements i j : : : . Let F denote the set of nite non-empty subsets N of N . T o e a c h N 2 F , w e associate G N , the set of cooperative transferable utility g a m e s with player set N. E v ery v 2 G N is identi ed with its characteristic function, i.e. v : 2 N ! IR s u c h that v( ) = 0. Hence G N f v 2 IR 2 N : v( ) = 0 g. Then G S N2F G N is the game space. For N 2 F v 2 G N , a n d M N, we allow that v may be considered as a game in G M .
For i 2 N , de ne F i = fN 2 F : i 2 Ng. An (individual) value for i 2 N is a mapping i : S N2F i G N ! IR, i.e. a value is a real valued function on the set of games in which the player participates. Let i denote the set of individual values for i, with generic elements i i : : : . Let = ( i ) i2N denote the set of (universal) group values, with generic elements : : :.
We adopt the following notational conventions. For j 2 N , S 2 F , Snj 5 is shorthand for S nf jg. denotes weak set inclusion, whereas denotes strict (proper) set inclusion. Often, it is convenient to consider local individual values i or (local) group values = ( i ) i2N with restricted domain G N for some N 2 F . W e shall do so when appropriate. The notation (N ) is used, if we w ant t o emphasize a local group value with domain G N .
Next we will examine several concepts for (individual) values in more detail.
Monotonicity
Let us x momentarily a player set N. W e s a y t h a t a g a m e v is i-monotonic for a player i 2 N, i f t h e w orth of a coalition increases when player i joins the coalition, i. Sometimes, we allow for the possibility t h a t a l l v alues are normalized in the sense that for (each p l a yer set and) each p l a yer there is one game on which all values attain the same numerical value. The dictator games are well suited for this purpose. From now on, whenever we o p t f o r s u c h a normalization, w e shall assume that i (u i ) = 1 holds for each v alue i .
A linear value satis es: the normalization assumption is equivalent to: P T Nnfig a i N T fig = 1 the dummy p l a yer property is equivalent to the combination of the null player property and the normalization assumption.
Well known linear values are the probabilistic values. A value i for player i is a probabilistic value if there exist probability w eights (i.e., non-negative and summing up to 1) p i N T T Nnfig, such that
A group value is probabilistic, if it is composed of probabilistic values. Using the above translations of value properties into properties of the weight system makes it evident that Theorem 1 (Weber 1988) i i s a p r obabilistic value if, and only if, i is linear, individually monotonic, and ful ls the dummy player property.
Symmetry
If is a permutation of the player set N and v is a game on N, t h e n v corresponds to the game where player j takes on the rô l e o f p l a yer (j) i n v. Theorem 2 A p r obabilistic group value is symmetric if, and only if, the corresponding weight system p ful ls p i N T = p j N S for any two players i and j and coalitions T and S with the same cardinality. 1 fig equally, i.e., i (N 1 fig ) = j (N 1 fjg ) for all i j 2 N. A s w e will see lateron, the combination of weak symmetry and basic symmetry implies symmetry under certain circumstances.
The NPO Property for Individual Values
We a r e n o w especially interested in values with the property
for all i j 2 N and v 2 G N such that j is a null player in v and i 6 = j. W e call this the \null player out" property or NPO(-property) for short.
We aim at characterizing the individual values that satisfying linearity, the null player property, w eak symmetry, and the NPO property.
Let us commence by examining the NPO-property in combination with the null player property and linearity. The latter two properties for a value i imply that this value can be written as
If we further impose the NPO-property w e obtain X T Nnfi jg
for each game v with null player j, and especially for the games (N w T ), T Nnfi jg, de ned by w T (S) = 1 f o r S = T f ig and S = T f i jg, a n d w T (S) = 0 otherwise. Therefore, we obtain p i Nnfjg T = p i N T + p i N T fjg for each N 2 N and T Nnfi jg: (3) In case (3) holds, one easily proves the NPO-property. W e conclude that Theorem 3 Suppose a value i sati es linearity and the null player property.
Then (2) holds. Moreover, i satis es the NPO property if, and only if, (3) holds.
Adding weak symmetry to linearity, t h e n ull player property, and NPO, has a strong implication: individual symmetry results. Assuming weak symmetry in addition to linearity, t h e n ull player property, and NPO, we m a y put i n = p i N = i (N 1 fig ) i.e., i n is the weight player i attaches to making it on his own, without seeking cooperation in a local population N of size n. N o w (3) implies i n;1 = i n + p i N fjg or p i N fjg = i n;1 ; i n (4) for all players i and j 6 = i in N. Using again (3), for any 1-person coalition T = fkg, together with (4) yields i n;2 ; i n;1 = i n;1 ; i n + p i N fj kg or p i N fj kg = i n;2 ; 2 i n;1 + i n : (5) Continuing in this way all weights can be described using i n : : : 
for all i 2 N, T Nnfig, n = jNj t= jT j.
Proof. The assertion is shown by induction to the number of players in N and T. F or n + t = jNj + jT j 5 w e h a ve p r o ved it already. N o w suppose (6) holds for all player sets N and coalitions T such that jNj + jT j < r . L e t N be a player set and T a coalition with jNj +jTj = r. W e m a y assume that n = jNj > 2 a n d n > t = jT j 1. Let i 2 NnT, j 2 T. (2) and (3). I f i is weakly symmetric, then it is individually symmetric and, moreover, the weights in (2) depend only on population size n = jNj and coalition size t = jT j and are First of all, a (in the usual sense) symmetric probabilistic group value is determined by w eights p n t 0 t n;1, with P n;1 t=0 0 @ n ; 1 t 1 A p n t = 1 for all n 2 N. By Lemma 1, our results encompass the crucial nding of Haller (1994 Proposition 9): has the NPO-property if, and only if, the weight equation \ p n;1 t = p n t + p n t+1 " holds for n 2, n ; 2 t 0.
Secondly, f o r n 2 IN, let IN(n) = fm 2 IN : m ng. De ne X = S n2IN IR IN(n) and the di erence operator : X ;! X by x = (( x) n+1 ( x) n+2 : : : ) = ( x n ; x n+1 x n+1 ; x n+2 : : : ) 2 IR IN(n+1) for x = ( x n x n+1 : : : ) 2 IR IN(n) . Solving equation (3) (3) etc. which determine the weights as follows: p i N T = h i n t = (t) jNj : (7) Condition (a) thus implies that all these arrays are nonnegative, i.e., i is nonnegative and each of the derived arrays (t) t 0, is decreasing. Let us call the array i = ( i n ) n2IN totally decreasing if all these conditions are met.
Thirdly, (6) 
Now w e can summarize our main insight a s f o l l o ws.
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Theorem 5 Let i be an individual value. Then the following are e quivalent.
(i) i is probabilistic and weakly symmetric and has the NPO property.
(ii) i is probabilistic and individually symmetric and has the NPO property.
(iii) There exists a totally decreasing array i satisfying (9) such that i is given by (2) and (7).
Notice that in particular, an individual value with the properties listed in the theorem is probabilistic. Therefore it is linear and satis es the dummy player axiom. Hence the normalization i (u i ) = 1 has to hold. Since the probability v ectors representing probabilistic values form a simplex of dimension 2 n;1 ; 1, there remain many degrees of freedom for additional nor- . Such a player is more eager to cooperate or share with the other players as the size of the local player population increases.
Example (BANZHAF VALUE): Cf. Haller (1994) , Ex.6: Fix 2 (0 1) and set p i n t = n;1;t (1 ; ) t . T h e n i n = n;1 . If = 1 =2, then i is the Banzhaf value: p i n t = ( 1 =2) n;1 and i n = ( 1 =2) n;1 . As the size of the local player population increases, this player becomes more eager to cooperate. The propensity to cooperate grows faster than in the case of the Shapley value. (i) is probabilistic and weakly symmetric and satis es basic symmetry and the NPO property.
(ii) i is probabilistic and symmetric and has the NPO property.
(iii) There exists a totally decreasing array satisfying (9) such that for each player i, i is given by (2) and (7), with i = .
As mentioned in the introduction, the NPO property is implicitly assumed in a \carrier-free" or \support-free" de nition of games and values as in Dubey, Neyman, and Weber (1981) 
{ Fourthly, e a c h ' N and consequently each local value (N ) inherits the local counterparts of the properties 1. | 4. from the semivalue '. H e n c e each of these local values is linear, monotonic, symmetric and has the dummy player property. Therefore, they are all symmetric probabilistic values.
{ Fifthly, consider i j 2 N i6 = j N 2 F i \ F j , a n d v 2 G N with j as a n ull player. Then (1) { Finally, consider a symmetric probabilistic group value on G that has the NPO property. Then the set of equations (10) can be used to de ne a semivalue ' on G. Therefore, we h a ve established Theorem 7 Let be a symmetric probabilistic group value on G. Then has the NPO property if, and only if, it is induced by a (uniquely determined) semivalue ' on G, that is a set of equations (10) holds.
In view of Theorem 7, the concept of a semivalue implicitly assumes the NPO property and it is not surprising that an analogue of the weight equation (3) appears in the analysis of Dubey, Neyman, and Weber (1981) . Further, the analysis of Dubey et al. parallels ours in another important aspect. They introduce arrays = ( 0 1 : : : ) b y setting n = p n+1 n for n = 0 1 : : : . Like o u r 's, the 's allow to recover all the local probability weights. The 's are particularly well suited to derive a representation of a semivalue | or rather of the associated probability w eights | by means of the moments of a probability distribution on the unit interval. In fact, each array = ( 0 1 : : : ) qualifying as the determinant of a semivalue consists of the sequence of moments for a unique . In contrast, the 's seem less suited for such a statistical interpretation. However, a term 1 ; n readily suggests itself for the game-theoretical interpretation as \propensity to cooperate" whereas we cannot think of a similar interpretation of the 's.
5 Conclusions
At the center of our investigation are the repercussions of assuming that the presence of a null player does not a ect the outcome for the other players. Our main emphasis lies on individual values. Speci cally within the class of linear values with the null player property, w e h a ve c haracterized the values satisfying weak symmetry as the ones which c a n b e r e c o vered from special arrays of numbers = ( n ) via (6) or (7). In order to generate a probabilistic value, these arrays have to be totally decreasing and must ful l (9). The elements of such an array re ect, in a sense, the weight a player attaches to making it on his own, without seeking cooperation in local populations of various sizes.
Our analysis shows that the NPO property i n c o m bination with other standard properties has non-trivial implications. As pointed out in 2.3, the NPO property follows from population monotonicity and oddness, hence in particular from population monotonicity and linearity. In Section 4, we argue that a carrier-free de nition of a semivalue implicitly assumes the NPO property.
